Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of chaotic systems in communications for cryptographic purposes has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. However, in most cases a serious performance evaluation is missing and claims about the achieved security levels are not rigidly proved. The reason for this may be some incompatibilities of measures that are used in the classical discrete-value cryptography with the inherent continuous-value nature of chaotic systems.
In this paper we use the term continuous-value system synonymously for nonlinear chaotic systems and with discrete-value systems we refer to classical and presently used cryptographical systems. By that we state explicitly the significant difference between these system classes.
The information-theoretic treatment of discretevalue systems in cryptography is almost exclusively based upon the Shannon measure of uncertainty and information [1] . Unfortunately, a straightforward generalization of Shannon's entropy for continuous-value variables does not lead to a compatible notation in that sense that the continuous entropy can be viewed as limit value obtained by discretizing a continuous interval on the real axis into equally-spaced subintervals and letting their number tend to infinity. However, there exist various attempts for an unified approach to discrete and continuous entropy notations [4] , which will also influence the following results.
II. INFORMATION CONTENT IN MAPS

A. Maps in cryptographical systems
Static maps as depicted in figure 1 are the central element in all cryptographical systems. This applies to static systems (i.e. block ciphers) as well as to dynamical systems (i.e. stream ciphers). From the viewpoint of cryptoanalysis they contain all of the uncertainty (about the key parameters) that is involved in the encryption process and that an attacker tries to reveal. Especially the analysis of continuous-value systems can be transformed into a pure static problem, which is due to the inherent selfsynchonization requirement [5] , [7] . 
B. Map space
We consider the endomorphic map
where $ is the symbol range on which the system operates. In the discrete case $ is the finite set of symbols
whereas in the continuous case we consider $ as the compact interval
on the real axis. For simplicity we restrict our consideration here to scalar maps, but all derivations may easily be extended to vector signals. In the following the term continuous map actually refers to the slightly more general term piecewise continuous map as it is shown in figure 2 .
A particular map where the keyspace r describes in some form the set h of possible maps. This uncertainty is an important performance measure for cryptosystems since it is the goal of almost all attacks to determine the key.
Examples of a discrete and a continuous map .
C. Uncertainty
In the discrete case the set of all one-to-one maps onto a set of elements is given by the family of permutations W 
If the one-to-one requirement is released the entropy
describes the uncertainty about a particular holds. In continuous-value cryptosystems it is necessary to discretize the keyspace which is naturally given continuously. This due to the requirement of a certain key distance [6] to ensure some elementary level of security. Furthermore we suppose that Kerckhoff's Principle [2] , [3] holds, i.e. the system structure and thus the structure of the involved maps is known. Then the only uncertainty is again due to the key which parametrizes the continuous map. Let the parameter vector t B l u be given as
where
are given by the componentwise decomposition of the discretized parameter space u . If the elements of t can be chosen independently with 5 q w y 1
, then, assuming the knowledge a bout the map parametrization, the uncertainty of a particular map
The significant difference between the discrete and the continuous case is that the uncertainty (3) of the discrete map is fully determined and upper-bounded by the cardinality of the symbol set E whereas the uncertainty (5) of the continuous map does not depend on the structure of the symbol range and has no corresponding upper bound (i.e. the parametrization and thus
can be extended arbitrarily).
D. Iterated maps
As an example for the application of the uncertainty measure we consider the -times iterated map which is often suggested for simple chaotic block cipher schemes
where ! is some continuous map parametrized by t . The idea of these systems is to exploit the sensitivity to initial conditions in chaotic systems to raise the encryption security. But in terms of the above derived measure, there is no gain of uncertainty about the map ! since the amount of parametrization remains unchanged, i.e.
where h describes the set of all -times iterated maps ! . However, the iterated map certainly has a higher topological complexity which can be characterized by other measures (as it is proposed in section III-B) and which, nevertheless, may have performance advantages.
III. EXTENDED MEASURES
The uncertainty measure considered in the previous section is closely related to Shannon's entropy notation since it still operates on variables of discrete nature. This has the advantage that the measures for the discrete and the continuous case can by directly compared. A more profound evaluation also needs to consider the map properties induced by the differences between the discrete and the continuous case.
A. An observation-driven measure
It is common use in cryptography to define performance measures not only by the amount of uncertain knowledge but also in terms of its observability. Such a measure corresponds more closely to the amount of output values ! 5 7 8
or input-output-pairs
that are necessary to determine the parameters of the map ! and thus can be a measure for the observation time. For the discrete case it could be determined as 
being the probability density of the input signal due to its value range plus a certain amount that describes the probability by which an observer can collect information about w y 1
. Note that the measures (8) and (8) are not comparable with (3) and (5), respectively, since they do not converge for a certain set of probabilities 5 q w y 1 8
. The observation-driven measure designed above implies the obvious fact that a parameter component with a small influence probability has a higher uncertainty than a component with a high probability, because the first one needs a longer observation time to collect according data. However, a smaller probability 5 q w18
of a certain parameter component w1 also decreases its overall influence on the encryption process and thus the knowledge that is obtained by determining the value of this component. The following example demonstrates which of these opposite effects dominates the behaviour of this measure. 
The actual values are not of interest here and may be different for all intervals and both maps. They can be chosen according to other requirements. The maps differ in their segment interval lengths, where we assume
The input signal is supposed to have a uniforḿ 
y ields a higher measure than map ! R
. In fact, equal influence intervals give the maximum value of the i 6 measure for uniquely distributed input signals . Additionally, a design criterion may derived: In order to maximize the i 6 measure, the segment intervals`1 of piecewise continuous maps should be chosen according to the probability distribution of in such a way that Í ¡ 5 7 8
holds, where Î denotes the number of segments. Then, each parameter component has the same significance to the encryption transformation and the knowledge of one of these components can not be more valuable than that of another one. While this requirement can be fulfilled easily for continuous maps, in the discrete case there can be obtained at most a rough approximation.
If the map 
B. A correlation-driven measure
In order to take into account the (piecewise) continuous character of maps in continuous systems and evaluate its effect on the encryption transformation a measure would be needed that deals with topological properties of the involved signals.
While the continuous signal already has its naturally given metric we have to provide a suitable one for the discrete signal to allow a comparison. Therefore we correspond the symbols
to equally spaced real numbers on the interval`F a b ( d c U 8
Now the input and the output signal of the discrete map as well as of the continuous map is a real-valued sequence
. We define the two distances
which describe the positive distances between two adjacent input values and between the corresponding output values, respectively. The measure
It describes the expectation of
as a function of Ð for the function space h Õ which is parametrized by t . This measure is closely related to the correlation between the input and output distance, but the function (15) gives a more illustrative measure. We will discuss its properties by considering the following examples:
Example 2: As the reference for the comparison with continuous maps we consider the family of permutations W for a sufficiently large
. Figure 4 (a) shows an example for F Ì
, where this permutation is embedded in a metric space using (12) with 
The expected output distance
is then given by
which is plotted in figure 6 . The inherent continuous shape of
makes it impossible to show perfect behaviour as it can be obtained for the discrete case in figure 4 . Moreover, the map family used in this example does not even approach asymptotically the perfect 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The paper presented some measures which may allow a more rigid evaluation of continuous-value encryption systems in comparison with classical discrete-value systems.
Of course, the comparison of discrete and continuous maps in the above examples is biased, since we used the most perfect map family in the discrete case and only very simple continuous maps. This was done for the simplicity of representation. Nevertheless, the examples show the generic property of continuous maps to preserve a considerable amount of metric information of the input signal, while this drawback is not present in discrete-value systems.
